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More than Winners and Losers: The 
Importance of Moving Climate and 
Environmental Policy Debate Toward a 
More Transparent Process 
Victor B. Flatt†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Anyone examining the political economy surrounding cli-
mate change in 2012 might assume that the United States, or a 
significant number of our political elite, believes that we will 
emerge as some kind of “winner” in the climate change arena. 
How else to explain the actions of our own country in the inter-
national arena? But as a possible reason for delaying action on 
climate change, this idea may be more or less verboten in cir-
cles of environmental law scholars and policy thinkers. Are we 
environmentalists the deluded peaceniks of our time? To para-
phrase Neville Chamberlain, in climate change, no matter 
“whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners, 
but all are losers.”1
 
†  Tom & Elizabeth Taft Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law, 
and Director of the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation, and Resources 
(CLEAR) at the University of North Carolina School of Law. The author would 
like to thank J.B. Ruhl for his very thoughtful article, and the editors at the 
Minnesota Law Review for seeking out this commentary. Also, thanks to the 
hard work of my RA, Dylan Mattaway-Novak. Copyright © 2013 by Victor B. 
Flatt. 
 As in the discussion of war, “polite compa-
ny” would rarely voice a sentiment celebrating winning while 
others lose tremendously, but not voicing the sentiment does 
not solve the problem. 
 1. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, IN SEARCH OF PEACE 140 (1939) (speech at 
National Government Rally, Kettering, England on July 2, 1938). Chamber-
lain was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940, during 
the time of negotiations with Nazi Germany and the build-up to World War II. 
ROBERT C. SELF, NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN: A POLITICAL LIFE 2–3 (2006). 
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Professor J.B. Ruhl’s article, The Political Economy of Cli-
mate Change Winners,2
This Article responds to Professor Ruhl’s article. It agrees 
with the need to recognize the “climate change winners” per-
ception phenomenon, but maintains that Professor Ruhl’s ar-
gument both makes too much of it and too little. In particular, 
this Article shows that the phenomenon is less ignored than he 
thinks, but argues that it is also the tip of a bigger and more 
important iceberg concerning what environmental scholars and 
policy makers have debated in terms of climate change and en-
vironmental policy generally. This Article then more fully ex-
plores the bigger problem of the policy discourse concerning 
climate change and environmental law, and suggests that the 
“environmental community” needs to shift its approach to the 
discussion of these problems and their solutions. 
 seeks to break down this wall of silence. 
In his article, Professor Ruhl sets out a case for the existence of 
“climate change winners,” the importance of recognizing this 
phenomenon for purposes of crafting climate change policy, and 
policy proposals that he believes will be more effective in ad-
dressing climate change given this “winners” phenomenon.  
In the environmental realm, we have come to a point 
where even broaching the subject of relative winners compared 
to losers seems like an immoral act. While I have routinely ar-
gued that environmental harms should be recognized as rights 
of the public and seen in terms of morality,3
I.  HIGHLIGHTING THE CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS 
PHENOMENON   
 I believe that this 
is an argument that stands on its own, without removing other 
discussions from the table. I am concerned that if we fail to 
have discussions with those who may not share our views, we 
will never progress (and indeed may fall backwards) in our 
analysis and policy of climate change and other environmental 
problems. We can no longer ignore this issue or others that may 
not be popular to discuss in the environmental movement. To 
make progress, all issues must be recognized, and we must be 
willing to engage in the discussion.  
In The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, Pro-
fessor Ruhl sets out to demonstrate the dearth of discussion re-
 
 2. J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 206 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the 
Environment), 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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garding what he terms “climate change winners,” and why this 
lack of discussion is important and problematic. The first part 
of the article seeks to set out the case that there is almost a 
conspiracy of silence about the concept that anyone could possi-
bly benefit from climate change, and that there are indeed per-
sons and communities who will benefit, at least relatively, from 
climate change in the near and medium term.4
Professor Ruhl’s discussion of the data on climate change 
effects is certainly convincing with respect to some benefits. As 
he notes: “Some impacts will open up opportunities for people 
and businesses to secure benefits in some areas, such as by in-
creased rainfall, longer growing seasons, and more temperate 
weather.”
 
5 And he also makes the very logical argument that, 
even assuming the net impacts of climate change are negative 
overall, this variance indicates that there will be some winners, 
particularly at local scales.6 He then connects this phenomenon 
to political actions at these scales and combinations of these 
scales that could influence large-scale policy, even to the point 
of undercutting efforts to try and reverse or mitigate climate 
change.7
Professor Ruhl’s thesis on climate change winners and how 
they could influence policy is certainly convincing. The data cit-
ed by Professor Ruhl itself comes from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the logic concerning the 





 4. Ruhl, supra note 
 The longer time scales of probable massive climate im-
pacts relative to short term phenomena also suggest how per-
sons could approach climate change as something desirable 
even if the long term effects are negative. Given these facts, one 
must acknowledge how important Professor Ruhl’s article is in 
naming the phenomenon of climate change winners and focus-
ing attention on it. I am convinced that he is correct that we 
must identify the phenomenon to avert more problems in craft-
ing climate change policy. While I agree in general with his call 
to recognize climate change winners, and agree that doing so 
2, at 208–14. 
 5. Id. at 207–08. 
 6. Id. at 208. 
 7. See id. at 214–15. 
 8. See id. at 207–08, 221–27 (citing the INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_ 
assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm). 
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can influence and improve policy, I think that in some ways he 
overstates the problem of lack of acknowledgement. 
Professor Ruhl asserts that “scientific and policy anal-
yses . . . pay little attention to . . . market and nonmarket bene-
fits” of climate change.9 If recognized, these benefits are only 
“begrudgingly” acknowledged in discussion that “invariably 
qualif[ies them] with discussion of adverse impacts.”10
It is true that most official documents rarely solely discuss 
the benefits from climate change, but it is also true that they 
have not been routinely ignored. Professor Ruhl’s own data on 
climate change benefits in agriculture and other areas come 
from none other than the IPCC’s reports, which have doggedly 
examined all impacts of climate change, including possible ben-
efits, at multiple levels and time scales.
 
11 In its most recent re-
port, from 2007, concerning climate change impacts, the IPCC 
discusses positive and negative impacts from climate change 
over time and the given uncertainty of these impacts.12 This in-
cludes increases in food productivity and timber production.13
Moreover, Professor Ruhl’s conclusion that there is already 
evidence that winners and losers will affect the political deci-
sion making of geographic areas supports the proposition that 
we are already aware of relative winners. 
 
In addition, I don’t believe the evidence supports Professor 
Ruhl’s general conclusion that many persons who are climate 
change winners do not necessarily recognize these benefits.14 
Certainly, Professor Ruhl is correct that “issue framing” mat-
ters in terms of perception; for example, someone who arguably 
benefits monetarily may not perceive benefits if he or she is 
worried about the impact on others.15 We certainly could use 
more studies on this particular question. But even without such 
surveys or much public discussion of winners and losers, most 
persons and certainly many businesses appreciate the ways in 
which even disasters can mean economic gain for some,16
 
 9. Id. at 209–10. 
 and 
 10. Id. at 210. 
 11. See id. at 207–08 & nn.2–3, 216–19. 
 12. See WORKING GRP. II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IM-
PACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 11–18 (2007), available at http://www 
.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 11–12. 
 14. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 269–76. 
 15. See id. at 236–37. 
 16. Joe Mont, How They (and You) Make Money off Disasters, 
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that relative gain may be perceived as better than net gain. As 
Professor Ruhl notes, official government documents have rec-
ognized opportunities in climate change,17 and surveys already 
show that some people believe they will benefit from such 
changes.18
More importantly, the persistence of entrenched groups 
and political positions that oppose action on climate change 
mitigation is just another version of persons who perceive a net 
short-term benefit from doing nothing to avert climate change, 
or at least a relative cost from performing actions to mitigate it. 
As Professor Ruhl notes, “[M]any people and businesses are 
generally dug in against investing in effective mitigation.”
 
19 
And I do not believe this is solely the result of selective infor-
mation assimilation. As noted by Upton Sinclair almost a cen-
tury ago, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, 
when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!”20
Importantly, Professor Ruhl notes that the perception of 
climate change winners depends on how those in society per-
ceive and care about risks to others versus risks to them-
 Stat-
ed more prosaically for today’s climate change discussion, we 
should not be surprised that companies that make money by 
manufacturing and selling products that cause increases in 
greenhouse gases will not voluntarily embrace facts, or policies 
based on those facts, that limit those profitable benefits. 
Whether or not these contributors to greenhouse gases are hurt 
by climate change, relatively speaking, they are better off than 
others who are hurt because the contributors also profit from 
the causes of the problem. Climate change war profiteers, if you 
will, have no incentive to see the war end when their only prof-
its come from selling the tanks. In this sense, climate change 
“winners” do recognize themselves and have already had an 
enormous influence on policy. Recognizing that others, such as 
farmers, can also benefit is important, but it is not new. 
 
MAINSTREET (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.mainstreet.com/article/ 
moneyinvesting/insurance/how-they-and-you-make-money-disasters. 
 17. Ruhl, supra note 2, at 215 (citing GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE IN-
TEGRATION GRP., FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR AD-
DRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2008), available at http://cms.oregon 
.gov/ENERGY/gblwrm/docs/ccigreport08web.pdf). 
 18. Id. at 238. 
 19. Id. at 244. 
 20. UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT 
LICKED 109 (1935). 
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selves.21 This underlies the whole article, and occasionally Pro-
fessor Ruhl points it out.22 This point alone deserves further 
study as it is an observation about how society has changed its 
attitudes on community versus individual goals. The rhetoric 
surrounding the first major domestic environmental laws of the 
1970s assumed a communitarian attitude or one that, even if 
based on self-interest, assumed that interests coincide.23 That 
has changed since the Reagan Revolution, and it may be this 
underlying phenomenon that creates a situation in which ac-
tion must be based on summing individual divergent interests 
and convincing people of the need for change.24
II.  THE SHUTDOWN OF POLICY DISCOURSE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GENERALLY MAY BE THE 
BIGGER PROBLEM   
 To the extent 
that this is true, society must examine its own definition of 
moral underpinnings with eyes open in order to understand 
personal behavior and the politics that result from it, including 
the politics from winners. 
I believe Professor Ruhl’s most important point is his ob-
servation of the apparent approbation in discussing climate 
change winners openly in the environmental community.25 But 
this aversion goes far beyond climate change to debate about 
most major environmental laws and policies. While the pro-
gressive environmental community has been clear about its de-
nunciations of cost-benefit analysis, and has elucidated most of 
the reasons why,26
I personally am fully supportive of the policies of wide-
spread protection and shared interests in our environmental 
laws,
 it has failed to broadly embrace a re-
visitation of the underlying policy goals of our environmental 
statutes and debate the merits of possible trade-offs in policy 
between certain forms of environmentalism and other interests, 
be they economic, moral, or other environmental concerns. 
27
 
 21. See Ruhl, supra note 
 but by failing to openly defend and discuss them, we are 
2, at 237, 239–40. 
 22. Id. at 247 (stating that Professor Ruhl “assum[es that people and 
businesses] act primarily out of self-interest”). 
 23. Victor B. Flatt, Too Big to Jail or Too Remote (or Rich) to Care?, 72 
MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 255–56. 
 26. Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and 
Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1164 (2008). 
 27. See Flatt, supra note 3, at 2–6. 
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skating on thin ice. It has long been noted that certain interests 
perceived as anti-environmental may “hide the ball” in terms of 
exaggerating the economic detriments from environmental law 
or understating the wide-spread benefits;28 however, certain 
environmental activists may themselves not address concerns 
that are important to the public.29 This could be chalked up to 
the fear of airing “dirty laundry” or giving the “other side” am-
munition, but failing to have an honest discussion and debate 
(even if only one-sided) may lead to policies that are best for no 
one (or a very few) winning out.30
Climate change mitigation itself provides a good example. 
In many environmental debates, the solving of climate change 
has become the solving of the use of fossil fuels, even though 
these are not the same things. While not using fossil fuels could 
have many benefits beyond climate change mitigation (less coal 
waste and conventional air pollution for starters), fossil fuel re-
duction itself is not the only path to climate change mitigation. 
When we fail to make this distinction, we give rise to criticisms 
and skepticism that the environmental community really cares 
less about climate change and only about getting its way. 
 
Less than two years ago in California, there were protests 
over designating a 10,000-square-foot house (which used Forest 
Stewardship Council-certified wood, low volatile organic com-
pound (VOC) paint, and many other sustainable features) as 
“green.”31 According to the environmentalists protesting, the is-
sue was not about the amount of energy or water used per se 
(in theory a building of any size could be water and energy self-
sufficient), but in the sheer size of the building itself.32 Neigh-
bors suggested that green buildings should only use “just 
enough.”33
 
 28. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 4–6 (2005). 
 While this may be laudable from a moral point of 
 29. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The 
Bush Administration and Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 308 
(2005) (noting that, while Republican presidents may be perceived as less en-
vironmentally friendly than Democratic ones, they may bring other important 
perspectives and innovation). 
 30. Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Val-
ues Back into the Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 12 (1999). 
 31. Fred A. Bernstein, How Green is My Mansion?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2012, at D4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/garden/11green 
.html?pagewanted=all. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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view, it is not necessarily true in terms of the scientific facts 
about environmental impacts. There are certainly many argu-
ments to be made with respect to this kind of home under phi-
losophy and equity, concerning relative incomes and resource 
choices among the public. But, at least with respect to the cold 
hard facts of the production of greenhouse gases (and even co-
harms), even large homes can be a positive in the fight against 
climate change if they can achieve zero greenhouse gas emis-
sions. 
By failing to acknowledge that greenhouse gas reduction is 
itself a discrete issue that we can and should analyze with re-
spect to other interests and concerns, many of us pretend that 
all “green” concerns come as a single package. This may pre-
vent much of the public, particularly in “libertarian minded” 
America, from taking the scientific findings seriously, believing 
instead that they are part of a plot to get Americans to change 
their behavior for other reasons. It can also mean bad policy as 
we may fail to consider the relative importance of environmen-
tal or other concerns by focusing only on one thing.34
We in the environmental community need to be clearer 
both to ourselves and the general public about what the issues 
with respect to the climate are, and understand that there are 
a range of response options. This does not mean that we may 
not disagree with some of those options (such as geo-
engineering), but it does mean that we need to be specific about 
why such options are not preferable, and what trade-offs exist 
and must be made. Where we do not have scientific certainty, 
we must acknowledge it. Clearly we cannot honestly debate 
what to do about climate change if we are unwilling to disen-
tangle climate change concerns from other important and re-
lated concerns. 
 
This applies not only to the context of climate change win-
ners and losers, but also other environmental debates. Social 
and political realities have a tremendous influence upon the 
question of whether environmental harms are harmful enough 
to warrant a particular level of intervention. Much of the high 
level of today’s environmental concern can be traced to chang-
ing awareness of harms and the increased appreciation of natu-
ral and health values.35
 
 34. Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Dangers of Carbon Reduction Tunnel 
Vision 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 A consideration of values may also re-
quire analysis of resource allocation preferences. Political 
 35. See Flatt, supra note 3, at 21. 
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realities, combined with moral concerns, influence the palata-
bility of regulating certain segments of the economy, the protec-
tion of certain populations, and the amount of funding to ac-
complish regulation. When faced with uncertainty, value 
systems can influence who is given rights, accountability, and 
responsibility for environmental harm. These values choices 
can easily be obscured by debates over implementation or sci-
ence, so it is critical that they be debated openly.36
It would be nice if we all wanted the same things or all won 
and lost together, but we do not. Controlling greenhouses gases 
or protecting endangered species may make investments under 
prior regulatory contexts worthless, and this may create win-
ners and losers. Does everyone need to win? No, but we should 
be aware of who should win and why, and perhaps be open to 
compensating those who are harmed. Or as in Professor Ruhl’s 
example, allow them to receive the “winner’s benefits” but not 
stay locked into that course forever.
 
37
In the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, legislators 
considered one of these trade-offs in the jobs benefits versus 
air-quality detriments of mining high-sulfur coal.
 
38 But the de-
bate was not as explicit about this choice as it could have been, 
and therefore, the outcome may not have been the best. We re-
quired higher cost technological pollution control so that there 
would still be jobs mining high-sulfur coal, instead of using re-
sources to invest in other employment opportunities in coal 
country.39
As Michael Vandenbergh has stated, “At the outset, the 
debate over establishment of the initial . . . goals could stimu-
late open discussion about both the importance of environmen-
tal protection and the trade-offs involved in environmental 
 And we are still paying the price for that. I would 
suggest that such a suboptimal outcome came from not openly 
exploring the importance of jobs, lifestyle, and history in one 
part of the country versus the right to be free from air pollu-
tion. Discussing these as trade-offs would have allowed us to 
engage with the complexity of values.  
 
 36. See Flatt, supra note 30, at 11. 
 37. See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 269–76. 
 38. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: 
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR 
HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 45 
(1981). 
39. See Allan R. Gold, Bush Clean Air Plan Called Energy Policy in the Mak-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1989, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1989/09/24/us/bush-clean-air-plan-called-energy-policy-in-the-making.html. 
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measures.”40
I know environmentalists are often scared of this debate 
because they think the environment will lose, and it might 
sometimes, but we might also be surprised. In any event, we 
live in a plural society, where we must all be educated and 
heard on important issues. Part of “getting there” is creating 
the proper mechanisms to discuss and understand the problem 
and to have ways of determining what our values are. A practi-
cal way to do this would be to know the science, separate the 
science from the policy considerations, and find out which poli-
cies have the support of our plurality. 
 Moreover, discussion of all of the issues openly 
gives the legislature the ability to alter statutes as needed with 
full information by all participants. 
The first is addressed by opening up the discussion and de-
bate to recognize that there are definitive scientific answers to 
definitive scientific problems. This will require education as 
well as different ways of constituting analysis of climate change 
in organizations such as the IPCC. Once we understand the 
science and its limitations, it becomes easier to disentangle pol-
icy responses. Determining public preferences is, of course, dif-
ficult as we have no ready answers to polling or understanding 
the interests of the public beyond general representative de-
mocracy, which seeks to balance interests with overall welfare 
enhancement. Nevertheless, simply separating out pure policy 
from other issues allows a focus to better frame decisions.41
New laws could help in some ways by funding methods to 
increase participation or to have local concerns and issues 
translated to larger fora. But to do that we would have to have 
practical funding and participatory mechanisms, perhaps 
something along the lines of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act.
 
42 We have already seen this push in discussion of disaster 
response and preparation for disaster,43
 
 40. Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New 
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 
803, 902 (1997). 
 and the reasoning ap-
plies to the wider environmental arena, which involves human 
choice as much it does in disaster and coastal development. 
 41. See Flatt, supra note 30, at 25. 
 42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464 (2006). 
 43. See Gavin Smith, Catastrophic Disaster Recovery: An Institutional 
Network Perspective, in PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR CATASTROPHIC 
DISASTERS (Rick Bissell ed., 2013). 
  
36 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [97:26 
 
An example of this broader vision of the environment 
comes from the international framework for sustainable devel-
opment, which looks at both environmental protection and eco-
nomic development. At the Rio+20 United Nations (U.N.) Con-
ference on Sustainable Development and even the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change COP 15 in Copen-
hagen, many of the side meetings focused on how adaptation 
funding can be accomplished.44 But rather than use the old 
paradigm of simple funds transfer, these discussions recognized 
that funding per se isn’t the solution.45 They recognized that 
adapting to the challenges of climate change might require an 
examination of productivity and jobs, the local environment, 
and women’s empowerment and education.46
  CONCLUSION   
 Drawing on the 
recent research of international funding organizations, persons 
discussing adaptation funding delivery in Copenhagen recog-
nized that there must and will be a better way to address the 
harms of climate change—and that if we are careful, we can do 
so in a manner that also mitigates climate change and general-
ly improve the lives of those affected. 
Professor Ruhl is absolutely right that we must continue to 
study and discuss the disparate impacts of climate change, 
even if these impacts create what might be considered “win-
ners.” He is also correct that this has implications for climate 
change policy and what will and could work going forward. But 
his article puts into relief an even more important phenome-
non—the failure of much of the environmental community to 
engage in honest debate about environmental and other values. 
What does being “open” about values discussion in the en-
vironmental realm mean? What are some of the values at play 
in climate change that are necessary to discuss winners and 
 
 44. Rep. of the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Dev., 48–51, June 20–22, 
2012, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/16 (2012) [hereinafter U.N. Sustainable Devel-
opment Report], available at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/ 
814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf; Rep. of the Conference of the 
Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, 6–7, 30–40, Dec. 7–19, 2009, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010) [hereinafter U.N. Conference of the Parties 
Report], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf. 
 45. U.N. Sustainable Development Report, supra note 44, at 48–53 (ac-
knowledging the need to focus on funding, technology, capacity building, trade, 
and registry commitments); U.N. Conference of the Parties Report, supra note 
44, at 6–7.  
 46. U.N. Sustainable Development Report, supra note 44, at 1–3. 
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losers? We can definitively say that it isn’t about simply mak-
ing our environment “natural.” Such a situation hasn’t really 
existed for hundreds of years, and most people long ago, implic-
itly agreed to some deviance from the “natural” for purposes of 
human happiness. But this is where it gets tricky. What can be 
considered in deciding human happiness? Are environmental 
amenities only important vis a vis how humans appreciate 
them? Or do they have independent value? Or is it indeed pos-
sible to do this? What about distributional effects? With respect 
to climate change in domestic law, do we only consider U.S. in-
terests, or do we consider other interests as well? Should we be 
looking at the highest aggregate benefit level, or does it matter 
if harms fall disproportionately on a few?  
I would state strongly that distributional values are im-
portant and that moral theory requires us to compensate those 
who are harmed in climate change and other harms on a group 
because of the actions of another group.47
We often think our environmental laws are unassailable. 
Who would vote against clean air? But we have seen again and 
again that there have been many attempts to weaken underly-
ing values through administrative fiat,
 Your values may be 
different. I challenge us to openly discuss these values. 
48 and in the last ten 
years, even calls for explicit retreat from important principles 
(such as the use of cost-benefit analysis in the setting of Clean 
Air Act standards49
 
). Unless we are willing to openly discuss 
why underlying policy prescriptions are important, and openly 
compare and balance them with others, I am afraid we will be 
unready for an assault on our environmental laws that we will 
not be able to repel.  
 
 47. See Flatt, supra note 3, at 19–24. 
 48. The Bush EPA attempted to redefine “routine maintenance, repair, 
and replacement” under Clean Air Act regulations, for instance. See New York 
v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 49. See Jenny Hopkinson, Bush EPA Air Chief Seeks CASAC Input on 
Costs of Stricter Ozone NAAQS, INSIDEEPA.COM (Nov. 5, 2012), http:// 
insideepa.com/Inside-EPA-General/Inside-EPA-Public-Content/bush-epa-air-
chief-seeks-casac-input-on-costs-of-stricter-ozone-naaqs/menu-id-
565.html?s=sm.  
